

they take up other themes of interest. Both discuss Confederate plundering, notwithstanding Lee's issue of General Order No. 73 (wrongly numbered by Woodworth as 72) prohibiting pillage. Woodworth argues convincingly, and Trudeau concurs, that the Army of Northern Virginia behaved no differently from other Civil War armies in this respect. Both authors also denounce, but offer little new information about, the appalling Confederate practice of enslaving northern free blacks.

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Winfield Scott Hancock: Gettysburg Hero. By Perry D. Jamieson. Abilene, Texas: McWhiney Foundation Press, 2003. ISBN 1-893114-39-2. Maps. Illustrations. Index. Pp. 199. \$29.95.

George Gordon Meade and the War in the East. By Ethan S. Rafuse. Abilene, Texas: McWhiney Foundation Press, 2003. ISBN 1-893114-36-8. Maps. Illustrations. Index. Pp. 192. \$29.95.

The most recent additions to the McWhiney Foundation Press's series on "Civil War Campaigns and Commanders," Perry D. Jamieson's *Winfield Scott Hancock: Gettysburg Hero* and Ethan S. Rafuse's *George Gordon Meade and the War in the East*, appear to be very similar books. Both are brief on biography while focusing on their selected commander's experiences in the Civil War. Each has numerous concise essays that tell the reader about other key individuals in the narrative. Both are relatively short yet well written. But it is there that the similarities end.

Jamieson's work does little more than narrate the events of Winfield Scott Hancock's career. There are few insights into Hancock's command style, his leadership, or the degree to which he influenced the fights in which his division and corps participated. For instance, the chapter entitled "The Third Day at Gettysburg" gives the impression that the most important thing Hancock did that critical afternoon was to ride his horse up and down his corps' line. According to Jamieson's narrative Hancock gave but two orders: one to Henry Hunt to open fire with his artillery; the other to Colonel Arthur Devereaux, commander of the 19th Massachusetts, telling him to plug a gap at "The Angle." Surely Hancock contributed more than this to the day's events.

Jamieson often narrates events that are not critical to Hancock's story. For instance, interspersed throughout the chapters that address Gettysburg is an account of J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry raid, an episode critical to the campaign, but one which adds little to an understanding of Hancock. Even more curious is the space dedicated to the election of 1876, an event which, at best, was tangential to Hancock's career, and where Jamieson incorrectly states the situation in the electoral college. The book lacks notes and has only the briefest of bibliographies. Though *Gettysburg Hero* will be of value

to those who have a casual interest in the Civil War, this is a work serious scholars can bypass.

Such is not the case with Ethan Rafuse's work. Rafuse provides extensive notes and a superb bibliography, containing sources he has used to delve deeply into Meade's personality, intellect, and his philosophy of war and politics, while also looking in detail at Meade as a battlefield commander. Perhaps the largest difference in the two books is that Rafuse's has a clearly identifiable thesis.

Rafuse tells the reader that his book "will delineate the forces that shaped the Union war effort in the East and the military and political problems Army of the Potomac generals encountered as they pursued victory" (p. 15). He identifies animosity between West Point-trained officers and the nation's political leadership as the overriding impediment to that army's successful operation. The most significant dispute, he argues, one which began with George B. McClellan, was "was over what line of operations Federal forces should adopt in Virginia." The West Pointers, Meade included, thought that the James River ought be the base of operations in Virginia, while the Lincoln administration insisted on the so-called Overland Route. Meade's Civil War career, Rafuse concludes, "was doomed to frustration by an operational approach he knew was flawed but was unable to convince a hostile civilian authority to change" (p. 16).

This is a thought-provoking and, for this reviewer, a controversial argument. In the end, I am not convinced. First, the dichotomy of West Pointers versus politicians is a false one. McClellan himself was a general with political aspirations, which was far more important than his West Point background in making him and his supporters suspect in Lincoln's eyes. Moreover, there were West Pointers, most prominently Henry Halleck, who endorsed the Overland Route. Another problem with the argument is that the alleged weaknesses of the Overland Route that, by Rafuse's account, plagued the Army of the Potomac, seemed not to have plagued Lee. Writing of maneuvers in the Fall of 1863, Rafuse argues "Much like John Pope's army had been, Lee recognized Meade's logistical dependence on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad made him vulnerable to a turning movement to the west" (p. 98). Why wasn't Lee similarly vulnerable? Why was Lee not as tied to railroads in his 1862 and 1863 invasions of the North (or in his maneuvers prior to Second Bull Run) as, apparently, the Army of the Potomac was when it operated in Virginia?

Because it ended up using the James River as its base of operations, Rafuse sees Grant's 1864 Overland Campaign as justification for McClellan's and, later, Meade's insistence upon that line of operations. This misses the difference between McClellan's (and perhaps Meade's) concept and that of Grant. McClellan seemed not to understand that the point of his operations had to be the defeat of the Confederate Army, not the capture of Richmond. McClellan exhibited almost no interest in the former and little in the latter once his way there had been blocked. For Grant, Richmond was the route to Lee's army, the anvil against which he hammered Lee.

For these and other reasons I found Rafuse's argument unconvincing, but fair-minded people can disagree on its merits. This is a well-researched, important work with a provocative argument, and it therefore deserves the attention of anyone with a serious interest in the Civil War.

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The Finishing Stroke: Texans in the 1864 Tennessee Campaign. By John R. Lundberg. Abilene, Texas: McWhiney Foundation Press, 2003. Maps. Photographs. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 175. \$16.95.

John Lundberg's *The Finishing Stroke* highlights the valor and dedication of Texans who served with the Confederate Army of Tennessee. Lundberg proposes to build upon the rank-and-file Texans' experience to make what the foreword calls a "bold argument" that command failures within the Army of Tennessee, particularly the leadership of Texan John Bell Hood, squandered the Confederacy's last chance at victory (p. 12). The "failure of command" thesis seems anything but bold given the similar conclusions found throughout the Army of Tennessee's historiography. Furthermore, the assessment that, if led by more capable commanders, the Army of Tennessee's 1864 Tennessee campaign could have "turned the tide" of the Civil War is dubious given recent scholarship on the Confederacy's rapidly deteriorating condition by late 1864. Therefore, *The Finishing Stroke* emerges as little more than a stale and flawed "fife and drum" campaign study.

Lundberg's narrative centers upon Hiram Granbury's Texans, but also includes Matthew Ector's Texas "Chubs." Unfortunately, a cumbersome and generic description of the campaign's prominent events all too often obscures the Texans' experience. Beyond detailing the valor and glory of Texans in enduring the Army of Tennessee's deplorable conditions and leadership, Lundberg provides scant evidence of who these Texans were or for their motivations for soldiering on given their circumstances. Texans themselves are rarely heard from in Lundberg's account, because he chose to draw heavily from secondary sources such as Craig Symonds's *Stonewall of the West: Patrick Cleburne and the Civil War* and Wiley Sword's *Embrace an Angry Wind: The Confederacy's Last Hurrah* to find descriptive evidence concerning the Texans. Instead of investigating the motivations behind the Texans' perseverance through primary sources, Lundberg's narrative reads like a warmed-over *Official Records* after-action report, telling us who was where and when, lauding the performance of the army and its junior commanders (especially Cleburne), while assigning sole blame to Hood for any failure. Thus, the Texans and rest of the army appear as mindless automata, especially at Spring Hill, arguably the campaign's most decisive point, where the Texans' lack of initiative let the Union army pass right by them, forcing Hood to launch the slaughter at Franklin.